How to equalise GMPs – High Court decision in the Lloyds case

After over 25 years of uncertainty, we now know that UK pension schemes must remove the last traces of sex inequality from benefits built up since May 17, 1990. Guaranteed minimum pensions are required to be different for men and women, and they create differentials in otherwise equal pensions which fluctuate over time. As a result of the Lloyds Banking Group judgment, trustees must correct those differentials for the future, and pay arrears for the past, but employers can control the costs of doing so. This is a significant step change for the pensions industry.

The Lloyds decision affects every defined benefit scheme which was formerly contracted-out and which has historic liabilities for GMPs as a result. Although most such schemes took action to equalise male and female members’ retirement ages following Barber, inequalities arising from the provision of GMPs were generally not addressed. There was no consensus on the need to equalise or the methodology to use if it were required.

In this briefing we explain the problem with GMPs, look at what the High Court has now told us we should all do, and offer some ideas on how to approach your GMP equalisation process.

Why GMPs cause trouble

Between April 6, 1978, and April 5, 1997, employers could contract their employees out of the then State Earnings Related Pension Scheme and pay reduced National Insurance contributions. In return the employer provided a guaranteed minimum pension benefit under its pension scheme in lieu of the SERPS benefit employees would forgo. In 1988 an alternative, money purchase contracting-out option was introduced, and in 1997 the original salary-related contracting-out system of GMPs changed to a reference scheme test. Despite the end of contracting-out on April 6, 2016, affected schemes still retain obligations relating to any GMPs they hold.

Ever since the ECJ’s Barber judgment on May 17, 1990, the principle of equal pay for men and women has applied to occupational pension scheme benefits in the UK. It was previously common to have different normal retirement ages for men and women, and other differences of treatment. Trustees had to “level up” benefits for the period from May 17, 1990, to the date benefit accrual was actually equalised in the individual scheme.

GMPs though, have always presented a particular equalisation problem. The GMP sits within the scheme pension and pushes up its overall value. The structure of the GMP is laid down by law and is inherently unequal as between men and women. GMPs come into payment at 65 for men, and 60 for women. In addition, the female GMP will be a larger proportion of her overall pension as a woman’s GMP accrued at a faster rate than a man’s to reflect her shorter working life.

This inherent inequality shows up as soon as the pension comes into payment. Revaluation of the GMP is at a different rate to the excess over the GMP and, for GMPs, finishes at the unequal GMP age. Late retirement factors are different for GMPs and the excess, and start for GMPs at the unequal GMP age. And finally pension indexation is different for the GMP and the excess. So a woman may initially see greater increases than an equivalent man, and then the situation may reverse over time. Who would end up better off in the end is difficult to predict, being a combination of many different factors.

With GMPs being statutory, and the degree, and indeed the victim, of inequality fluctuating over time, there was no consensus in the industry as to the extent to which further equalisation was needed, nor the method to deliver it. The risk of getting it wrong was high and potentially expensive.

The beginning of the end: the Lloyds case

Prompted by some union-sponsored individual equality claims to the Employment Tribunal, in 2016, the trustee of three pension schemes in the Lloyds Banking Group ( LBG ) sought directions from the High Court on the need to equalise benefits for the effect of unequal GMPs. The judge considered four main issues.

In the Lloyds Banking Group judgment handed down on October 26, 2018, the judge, Morgan J, confirmed that

The judgment affects all pension schemes which contain salary-related contracted-out benefits built up between 1990 and 1997 (i.e. GMPs). This includes defined contribution schemes with an underpin of contracted-out benefits, but doesn’t directly affect pure defined contribution schemes.

Drilling down into the detail: how to equalise benefits

The court tested various methods to deliver equalisation of benefits, looking at the potential impact of each on members and employers. The methods tested are in the table below. A second judgment in December 2018 confirmed the calculation of method D. Part of the test was the estimated financial impact. LBG estimated the increased value of liabilities under each method based on the three schemes’ own member data, demographics, scheme rules, administrative practices and history of revaluation and pension increases. For these specific schemes the methods produced very different increases in liabilities, with method A being the most expensive for LBG and C and D the least.

The figures below do not include the administrative costs of delivering the benefits, which may significantly alter the overall financial impact.

MethodHow it worksIncrease in liabilities
A3 (element by element) Each unequal element of the part of the member’s pension earned between 1990-1997 is taken separately each year and adjusted upwards to remove any inequality. £300m
B (best each year) An annual comparison of the member’s actual pension for 1990-1997 service with that of a notional member of the opposite sex, and payment of the higher amount. This was the method suggested by the Government in 2012. £135m
C1 (cumulative equality) As B but offsetting past overpayments so the cumulative pension is always equal, but the actual pension may not be. £100m
C2 (cumulative equality + interest) As C1 but applying simple interest of 1 per cent. over base rate to past overpayments to reflect the value of money received earlier.
D1 (actuarial equivalence) A one-off actuarial comparison of the value of total male/female 1990-1997 benefits (or the remaining value after equalising the past where benefits are in payment), and conversion of any difference in value into an additional tranche of pension for the disadvantaged sex. Assuming C2 is used for initial equalisation of past payments, £100m
D2 (GMP conversion) Use eg. C2 to calculate back payments, then D1 for the future but also use GMP legislation to convert all GMPs to conventional benefits to give members equal capital value in a different format. Requires employer consent.

The judge decided that the trustee must equalise benefits for the impact of GMPs earned after the Barber case, and that this could be achieved in a number of ways. However, of the methods outlined above, C2 was the only one which the trustee in this particular case could adopt without the consent of the employer.

To get to that conclusion the judge took account of the “principle of minimum interference” with the rights of any party. For the employer this means that where one method of equalisation is significantly more expensive to the employer than another method, this infringed the rights of the employer and could not be adopted by the trustee without employer consent. For the LBG schemes that meant method A3 was immediately disqualified unless LBG consented.

Minimum interference also protects members. Method D1 was ruled out because of its impact on members. Although it was less costly from an administrative point of view (and was therefore favoured by LBG) it was based on assumptions so was highly unlikely to deliver the right result for any individual member. Method D2 (which involves GMP conversion) was equally flawed, but is lawful because it is enshrined in statute. The judge also helpfully confirmed that the statutory conversion basis is workable as currently written, despite the doubts expressed by the pensions industry in the past. However it requires employer consent, which LBG had not given.

For LBG, that left the trustee with method C2 unless LBG agrees to something else. However that doesn’t mean it will be the default for every scheme, or that employers won’t prefer other options because of the implementation and administration costs. The only option not on the table for on-going schemes is D1 because of its potentially detrimental effect on members.

Drilling down into the detail: arrears

Trustees must now pay arrears of underpaid pension as well as fixing future payments. As well as ordering the trustee to pay interest on the arrears, the judge also looked at how far back trustees must go to top-up past payments. He concluded that the default is that there is no natural stopping point – trustees are liable to correct all past underpayments. However, if the scheme itself has a forfeiture rule which provides that trustees only pay up to six years of arrears, the trustees must limit back-payments to that period.

Not every scheme has a six year rule, and even when it does, the rule as drafted may still not cover this particular liability. We have already looked at a wide variety of such rules, some less helpful than others. That means that, as with the Government’s change from RPI to CPI a few years ago for pension indexation, we have another drafting lottery on our hands. As a result we could easily see other cases brought about this issue.

Action stations to equalise pensions for GMPs

The effect of the Lloyds judgment is that the obligation to pay benefits equally actually started on May 17, 1990, so trustees are already in breach and in arrears. There will now have to be a big push to correct everything as speedily as possible. You cannot wait for individuals to come forward to claim their benefits.

Stage 1: immediate next steps